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Abstract
Optimal stopping theory is a powerful tool for analyzing scenarios such as online auctions in which
we generally require optimizing an objective function over the space of stopping rules for an allocation
process under uncertainty. Perhaps the most classic problems of stopping theory are the prophet inequal-
ity problem and the secretary problem. The classical prophet inequality states that by choosing the same
threshold OPT/2 for every step, one can achieve the tight competitive ratio of 0.5. On the other hand,
for the basic secretary problem, the optimal strategy achieves the tight competitive ratio of 1/e ≈ 0.36
In this paper, we introduce prophet secretary, a natural combination of the prophet inequality and the
secretary problems. An example motivation for our problem is as follows. Consider a seller that has an
item to sell on the market to a set of arriving customers. The seller knows the types of customers that may
be interested in the item and he has a price distribution for each type: the price offered by a customer of
a type is anticipated to be drawn from the corresponding distribution. However, the customers arrive in
a random order. Upon the arrival of a customer, the seller makes an irrevocable decision whether to sell
the item at the offered price. We address the question of finding a strategy for selling the item at a high
price. In particular, we show that by using a single uniform threshold one cannot break the 0.5 barrier of
the prophet inequality for the prophet secretary problem. However, we show that
• using n distinct non-adaptive thresholds one can obtain a competitive ratio that goes to (1−1/e ≈
0.63) as n grows; and
• no online algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio better than 0.75.
Our results improve the (asymptotic) approximation guarantee of single-item sequential posted pricing
mechanisms from 0.5 to (1− 1/e) when the order of agents (customers) is chosen randomly.
We also consider the minimization variants of stopping theory problems and in particular the prophet
secretary problem. Interestingly, we show that, even for the simple case in which the input elements
are drawn from identical and independent distributions (i.i.d.), there is no constant competitive online
algorithm for the minimization variant of the prophet secretary problems. We extend this hardness result
to the minimization variants of both the prophet inequality and the secretary problem as well.
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1 Introduction
Optimal stopping theory is a powerful tool for analyzing scenarios in which we generally require optimizing
an objective function over the space of stopping rules for an allocation process under uncertainty. One such a
scenario is the online auction which is the essence of many modern markets, particularly networked markets
where information about goods, agents, and outcomes is revealed over a period of time and the agents must
make irrevocable decisions without knowing future information. Combining optimal stopping theory with
game theory allows us to model the actions of rational agents applying competing stopping rules in an online
market.
Perhaps the most classic problems of stopping theory are the prophet inequality and the secretary prob-
lem. Research investigating the relation between online auction mechanisms and prophet inequalities was
initiated by Hajiaghayi, Kleinberg, and Sandholm [17]. They observed that algorithms used in the derivation
of prophet inequalities, owing to their monotonicity properties, could be interpreted as truthful online auction
mechanisms and that the prophet inequality in turn could be interpreted as the mechanism’s approximation
guarantee. Later Chawla, Hartline, Malec, and Sivan [11] showed the applications of prophet inequalities
in Bayesian optimal mechansim design problems. The connection between the secretary problem and on-
line auction mechanisms has been explored by Hajiaghayi, Kleinberg and Parkes [16] and initiated several
follow-up papers (see e.g. [7, 8, 9, 18, 20]).
Prophet Inequality. The classical prophet inequality has been studied in the optimal stopping theory
since the 1970s when introduced by Krengel and Sucheston [19, 22, 23] and more recently in computer
science Hajiaghayi, Kleinberg and Sandholm [17]. In the prophet inequality setting, given (not necessarily
identical) distributions {D1, . . . ,Dn}, an online sequence of values X1, · · · , Xn where Xi is drawn from Di,
an onlooker has to choose one item from the succession of the values, where Xk is revealed at step k. The
onlooker can choose a value only at the time of arrival. The onlooker’s goal is to maximize her revenue.
The inequality has been interpreted as meaning that a prophet with complete foresight has only a bounded
advantage over an onlooker who observes the random variables one by one, and this explains the name
prophet inequality.
An algorithm for the prophet inequality problem can be described by setting a threshold for every step:
we stop at the first step that the arriving value is higher than the threshold of that step. The classical prophet
inequality states that by choosing the same threshold OPT/2 for every step, one achieves the competitive
ratio of 1/2. Here the optimal solution OPT is defined as E [maxXi]. Naturally, the first question is whether
one can beat 1/2. Unfortunately, this is not possible: let q = 1ǫ , and q
′ = 0. The first value X1 is always 1.
The second value X2 is either q with probability ǫ or q ′ with probability 1 − ǫ. Observe that the expected
revenue of any (randomized) online algorithm is max(1, ǫ( 1ǫ )) = 1. However the prophet, i.e., the optimal
offline solution would choose q ′ if it arrives, and he would choose the first value otherwise. Hence, the
optimal offline revenue is (1− ǫ)× 1+ ǫ( 1ǫ) ≈ 2. Therefore we cannot hope to break the 1/2 barrier using
any online algorithm.
Secretary Problem. Imagine that you manage a company, and you want to hire a secretary from a pool
of n applicants. You are very keen on hiring only the best and brightest. Unfortunately, you cannot tell
how good a secretary is until you interview him, and you must make an irrevocable decision whether or
not to make an offer at the time of the interview. The problem is to design a strategy which maximizes
the probability of hiring the most qualified secretary. It is well-known since 1963 by Dynkin in [12] that
the optimal policy is to interview the first t − 1 applicants, then hire the next one whose quality exceeds
that of the first t − 1 applicants, where t is defined by
∑n
j=t+1
1
j−1 ≤ 1 <
∑n
j=t
1
j−1 . As n → ∞, the
probability of hiring the best applicant approaches 1/e ≈ 0.36, as does the ratio t/n. Note that a solution to
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the secretary problem immediately yields an algorithm for a slightly different objective function optimizing
the expected value of the chosen element. Subsequent papers have extended the problem by varying the
objective function, varying the information available to the decision-maker, and so on, see e.g., [1, 15, 26,
27].
1.1 Further Related Work
Prophet Inequality. The first generalization of the basic prophet inequality introduced by Krengel and
Sucheston [19, 22, 23] is the multiple-choices prophet inequality [6] in which both the onlooker and the
prophet have k > 1 choices. Currently, the best algorithm for this setting is due to Alaei [2], who gave an
online algorithm with (1 − 1√
k+3
)-competitive ratio for k-choice optimal stopping. Besides this, we have
two generalizations for the (multiple-choices) prophet inequality that are matroid prophet inequality [21]
and matching prophet inequality [3].
In the matroid prophet inequality, we are given a matroid whose elements have random weights sam-
pled independently from (not necessarily identical) probability distributions on R+. We then run an online
algorithm with knowledge of the matroid structure and of the distribution of each element’s weight. The
online algorithm must then choose irrevocably an independent subset of the matroid by observing the sam-
pled value of each element (in a fixed, prespecified order). The online algorithm’s payoff is defined to be
the sum of the weights of the selected elements. Kleinberg and Weinberg [21] show that for every matroid,
there is an online algorithm whose expected payoff is at least half of the expected weight of the maximum-
weight basis. Observe that the original prophet inequality introduced by Krengel and Sucheston [19, 22, 23]
corresponds to the special case of rank-one matroids.
The matching prophet inequality is due to Alaei, Hajiaghayi, and Liaghat [5, 3, 4]. Indeed, they study
the problem of online prophet-inequality matching in bipartite graphs. There is a static set of bidders and
an online stream of items. The interest of bidders in items is represented by a weighted bipartite graph.
Each bidder has a capacity, i.e., an upper bound on the number of items that can be allocated to him. The
weight of a matching is the total weight of edges matched to the bidders. Upon the arrival of an item, the
online algorithm should either allocate it to a bidder or discard it. The objective is to maximize the weight
of the resulting matching. Here we assume we know the distribution of the incoming items in advance and
we may assume that the tth item is drawn from distribution Dt. They generalize the 12 -competitive ratio of
Krengel and Sucheston [22] by presenting an algorithm with an approximation ratio of 1− 1√
k+3
where k is
the minimum capacity. Oberve that the classical prophet inequality is a special case of this model where we
have only one bidder with capacity one, i.e., k = 1 for which they get the same 12 -competitive ratio.
Secretary Problem. The first generalization of the basic secretary problem [12] is the multiple-choice
secretary problem [8] (see a survey by Babaioff et al. [8])) in which the interviewer is allowed to hire up
to k ≥ 1 applicants in order to maximize performance of the secretarial group based on their overlapping
skills (or the joint utility of selected items in a more general setting). More formally, assuming applicants
of a set S = {a1, a2, · · · , an} (applicant pool) arriving in a uniformly random order, the goal is to select a
set of at most k applicants in order to maximize a non-negative profit function f : 2S 7→ R≥0. For example,
when f(T) is the maximum individual value [13, 14], or when f(T) is the sum of the individual values in
T [20], the problem has been considered thoroughly in the literature. Beside this, two generalizations for
the (multiple-choices) secretary problem are submodular secretary [10] and matroid secretary [9].
The submodular secretary problem is introduced by Bateni, Hajiaghayi, and Zadimoghaddam [10]. In-
deed, both of the maximum individual value [13, 14] and the sum of the individual values [20] aforemen-
tioned are special monotone non-negative submodular functions. Bateni, Hajiaghayi, and Zadimoghaddam
[10] give an online algorithm with ( 7
1−1/e
)-competitive ratio for the submodular secretary problem. We
2
should mention that there are more recent results with better constant competitive ratio (See for example the
references in [10]).
In the matroid secretary problem considered by Babaioff et al. [9], we are given a matroid with a ground
set U of elements and a collection of independent (feasible) subsets I ⊆ 2U describing the sets of elements
which can be simultaneously accepted. The goal is to design online algorithms in which the structure of U
and I is known at the outset (assume we have an oracle to answer whether a subset of U belongs to I or
not), while the elements and their values are revealed one at a time in a random order. As each element is
presented, the algorithm must make an irrevocable decision to select or reject it such that the set of selected
elements belongs to I at all times. Babaioff et al. [9] present an O(log r)-competitive algorithm for general
matroids, where r is the rank of the matroid. However, they leave as a main open question the existence
of constant-competitive algorithms for general matroids. On the other hand, there are several follow-up
works including the recent FOCS 2014 paper due to Lachish [24] which gives O(log log rank)-competitive
algorithm.
2 Our Contributions
In this paper, we introduce prophet secretary as a natural combination of the prophet inequality problem and
the secretary problem with applications to the Bayesian optimal mechanism design. Consider a seller that
has an item to sell on the market to a set of arriving customers. The seller knows the types of customers that
may be interested in the item and he has a price distribution for each type: the price offered by a customer
of a type is anticipated to be drawn from the corresponding distribution. However, the customers arrive in a
random order. Upon the arrival of a customer, the seller makes an irrevocable decision to whether sell the
item at the offered price. We address the question of maximizing the seller’s gain.
More formally, in the prophet secretary problem we are given a set {D1, . . . ,Dn} of (not necessarily
identical) distributions. A number Xi is drawn from each distribution Di and then, after applying a random
permutation π1, . . . , πn, the numbers are given to us in an online fashion, i.e., at step k, πk and Xπk are
revealed. We are allowed to choose only one number, which can be done only upon receiving that number.
The goal is to maximize the expectation of the chosen value, compared to the expectation of the optimum
offline solution that knows the drawn values in advance (i.e., OPT = E [maxi Xi]). For the ease of notation,
in what follows the index i iterates over the distributions while the index k iterates over the arrival steps.
An algorithm for the prophet secretary problem can be described by a sequence of (possibly adaptive)
thresholds 〈τ1, . . . , τn〉: we stop at the first step k that Xπk ≥ τk. In particular, if the thresholds are non-
adaptive, meaning that they are decided in advance, the following is a generic description of an algorithm.
The competitive ratio of the following algorithm is defined as E[Y]OPT .
Algorithm Prophet Secretary
Input: A set of distributions {D1, . . . ,Dn}; a randomly permuted stream of numbers
(Xπ1 , . . . , Xπn) drawn from the corresponding distributions.
Output: A number Y.
(1) Let 〈τ1, . . . , τn〉 be a sequence of thresholds.
(2) For k← 1 to n
(a) If Xπk ≥ τk then let Y = Xπk and exit the For loop.
(3) Output Y as the solution.
3
Recall that when the arrival order is adversarial, the classical prophet inequality states that by choosing
the same threshold OPT/2 for every step, one achieves the tight competitive ratio of 1/2. On the other
hand, for the basic secretary problem where the distributions are not known, the optimal strategy is to let
τ1 = · · · = τn
e
= ∞ and τn
e
+1 = · · · = τn = max(Xπ1 , . . . , Xπn
e
). This leads to the optimal competitive
ratio of 1e ≃ 0.36. Hence, our goal in the prophet secretary problem is to beat the 1/2 barrier.
We would like to mention that in an extension of this problem, in which the seller has B identical items
to sell, it is indeed easier to track the optimal solution since we have multiple choices. In fact, an algorithm
similar to that of [3, 4] can guarantee a competitive ratio of 1 − 1√
B+3
which goes to one as B grows.
We first show that unlike the prophet inequality setting, one cannot obtain the optimal competitive ratio
by using a single uniform threshold. Indeed, in Section 4 we show that 1/2 is the best competitive ratio
one can achieve with uniform thresholds. To beat the 12 barrier, as a warm up we first show in Section 5
that by using two thresholds one can achieve the competitive ratio of 5/9 ≃ 0.55. This can be achieved by
choosing the threshold 5
9
·OPT for the first half of the steps and then decreasing the threshold to OPT
3
for the
second half of the steps. Later in Section 6, we show that by setting n distinct thresholds one can obtain the
(1 − 1/e ≈ 0.63)-competitive ratio for the prophet secretary problem.
Theorem 1 Let 〈τ1, . . . , τn〉 be a non-increasing sequence of n thresholds, such that (i) τk = αk ·OPT for
every k ∈ [n]; (ii) αn = 1n+1 ; and (iii) αk = nαk+1+1n+1 for k ∈ [n − 1]. The competitive ratio of Algorithm
Prophet Secretary invoked with thresholds τk’s is at least α1. When n goes to infinity, α1 converges to
1 − 1/e ≈ 0.63.
Remark 2 We should mention that Yan in [28] establishes a 1 - 1/e approximation when the designer is
allowed to choose the order of arrival. Thus, Theorem 1 can be viewed as improving that result by showing
that a random arrival order is sufficient to obtain the same approximation.
The crux of the analysis of our algorithm is to compute the probability of picking a value x at a step
of the algorithm with respect to the threshold factors αk’s. Indeed one source of difficulty arises from the
fundamental dependency between the steps: for any step k, the fact that the algorithm has not stopped in the
previous steps leads to various restrictions on what we expect to see at the step k. For example, consider
the scenario that D1 is 1 with probability one and D2 is either 2 or 0 with equal probabilities. Now if the
algorithm chooses τ1 = 1, then it would never happen that the algorithm reaches step two and receives a
number drawn from D2! That would mean we have received a value from D1 at the first step which is a
contradiction since we would have picked that number. In fact, the optimal strategy for this example is to
shoot for D2! We set τ1 = 2 so that we can ignore the first value in the event that it is drawn from D1. Then
we set τ2 = 1 so that we can always pick the second value. Therefore in expectation we get 5/4 which is
slightly less than OPT = 6/4.
To handle the dependencies between the steps, we first distinguish between the events for k ∈ [n] that
we pick a value between τk+1 and τk. We show that the expected value we pick at such events is indeed
highly dependent on θ(k), the probability of passing the first k elements. We then use this observation
to analyze competitive ratio with respect to θ(k)’s and the thresholds factors αk’s. We finally show that
the competitive ratio is indeed maximized by choosing the threshold factors described in Theorem 1. In
Section 5, we first prove the theorem for the simple case of n = 2. This enables us to demonstrate our
techniques without going into the more complicated dependencies for general n. We then present the full
proof of Theorem 1 in Section 6. We would like to emphasize that our algorithm only needs to know the
value of OPT , thus requiring only a weak access to the distributions themselves.
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As mentioned before, Bayesian optimal mechanism design problems provide a compelling application
of prophet inequalities in economics. In such a Bayesian market, we have a set of n agents with private types
sampled from (not necessary identical) known distributions. Upon receiving the reported types, a seller has
to allocate resources and charge prices to the agents. The goal is to maximize the seller’s revenue in equi-
librium. Chawla et al. [11] pioneered the study the approximability of a special class of such mechanisms,
sequential posted pricing (SPM): the seller makes a sequence of take-it-or-leave-it offers to agents, offering
an item for a specific price. They show although simple, SPMs approximate the optimal revenue in many
different settings. Therefore prophet inequalities directly translate to approximation factors for the seller’s
revenue in these settings through standard machineries. Indeed one can analyze the so-called virtual val-
ues of winning bids introduced by Roger Myerson [25], to prove via prophet inequalities that the expected
virtual value obtained by the SPM mechanism approximates an offline optimum that is with respect to the
exact types. Chawla et al. [11] provide a type of prophet inequality in which one can choose the ordering
of agents. They show that under matroid feasibility constraints, one can achieve a competitive ratio of 0.5
in this model, and no algorithm can achieve a ratio better 0.8. Kleinberg and Weinberg [21] later improved
there result by giving an algorithm with the tight competitive ratio of 0.5 for an adversarial ordering. Our
result can be seen as improving their approximation guarantees to 0.63 for the case of single-item SPMs
when the order of agents are chosen randomly.
On the other hand, from the negative side the following theorem shows that no online algorithm can
achieve a competitive ratio better than 0.75. The proof is given in Section 7.
Theorem 3 For any arbitrary small positive number ǫ, there is no online algorithm for the prophet secretary
problem with competitive ratio 0.75 + ǫ.
We also consider the minimization variants of the prophet inequality problem, the prophet secretary
problem and the secretary problem. In the minimization variant, we need to select one element of the input
and we aim to minimize the expected value of the selected element. In particular, we show that, even for
the simple case in which numbers are drawn from identical and independent distributions (i.i.d.), there is
no
(1.11)n
6 competitive online algorithm for the minimization variants of the prophet inequality and prophet
secretary problems.
Theorem 4 The competitive ratio of any online algorithm for the minimization prophet inequality with n
identical and independent distributions is bounded by (1.11)
n
6 . This bound holds for the minimization prophet
secretary problem as well.
Furthermore, we empower the online algorithm and assume that the online algorithm can withdraw and
change its decision once. Indeed, for the minimization variants of all, prophet secretary problem, secretary
problem and prophet inequality, we show that there is no C competitive algorithm, where C is an arbitrary
large number. The proof of Theorem 4 and this last result are given in Section 7.2.
3 Preliminaries
We first define some notation. For every k ∈ [n], let zk denote the random variable that shows the value
we pick at the kth step. Observe that for a fixed sequence of drawn values and a fixed permutation, at most
one of zk’s is non-zero since we only pick one number. Let z denote the value chosen by the algorithm.
By definition, z =
∑n
k=1 zk. In fact, since all but one of zk’s are zero, we have the following proposition.
We note that since the thresholds are deterministic, the randomness comes from the permutation π and the
distributions.
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Proposition 5 Pr [z ≥ x] =
∑
k∈[n] Pr [zk ≥ x].
For every k ∈ [n], let θ(k) denote the probability that Algorithm Prophet Secretary does not choose a
value from the first k steps. For every i ∈ [n] and k ∈ [n − 1], let q−i(k) denote the probability that event
(i) happens conditioned on event (ii).
(i) Algorithm Prophet Secretary does not choose a value from the first k elements.
(ii) None of the first k values are drawn from Di.
Proposition 6 If the thresholds of Algorithm Prophet Secretary are non-increasing, then for every i ∈ [n]
and k ∈ [n − 1], we have θ(k+ 1) ≤ q−i(k).
Proof : In what follows let i ∈ [n] be a fixed value. The claim is in fact very intuitive: q−i(k) is the
probability of the event that the algorithm passes k values chosen from all distributions but Di. On the other
hand, θ(k+ 1) corresponds to the event that the algorithm passes k+ 1 values chosen from all distributions.
Intuitively, in the latter we have surely passed k values chosen from all but Di. Therefore θ(k + 1) cannot
be more than q−i(k).
Formalizing the intuition above, however, requires an exact formulation of the probabilities. For a
permutation s of size k of [n], let s(j), for j ∈ [k], denote the number at position j of s. For k ∈ [n], let
S(k) denote the set of permutations of size k of [n]. Let S−i(k) denote the set of permutations of size k of
[n]\{i}. Observe that
|S(k)| =
n!
(n − k)!
and |S−i(k)| =
(n − 1)!
(n − 1− k)!
In particular, we note that |S(k+ 1)| = n|S−i(k)|. We can now write down the exact formula for q−i(k) and
θ(k+ 1).
θ(k + 1) =
1
|S(k+ 1)|
∑
s∈S(k+1)
∏
j∈[k+1]
Pr
[
Xs(j) < τj
] (1)
q−i(k) =
1
|S−i(k)|
∑
s∈S−i(k)
∏
j∈[k]
Pr
[
Xs(j) < τj
] (2)
We now show that θ(k + 1) can be written down as a convex combination of terms that are less than
q−i(k). For every ℓ ∈ [k], let S(k+ 1, ℓ) = {s ∈ S(k+ 1)|s(ℓ) = i}. We have
∑
s:S(k+1,ℓ)
∏
j∈[k+1]
Pr
[
Xs(j) ≤ τj
]
≤
∑
s:S(k+1,ℓ)
∏
j∈[k+1]\{ℓ}
Pr
[
Xs(j) ≤ τj
]
≤
∑
s:S(k+1,ℓ)
∏
j∈[k]\{ℓ}
Pr
[
Xs(j) ≤ τj
]
× Pr
[
Xs(k+1) ≤ τℓ
]
=
∑
s:S−i(k)
∏
j∈[k]
Pr
[
Xs(j) ≤ τj
]
,
where the first inequality is since Pr [Xi < τℓ] ≤ 1 and the second inequality is because Pr
[
Xs(k+1) ≤ τk+1
]
≤
Pr
[
Xs(k+1) ≤ τℓ
]
and since τk+1 ≤ τℓ.
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Thus, using Equation 2 we have
∑
s:S(k+1,ℓ)
∏
j∈[k+1]
Pr
[
Xs(j) ≤ τj
]
=
∑
s:S−i(k)
∏
j∈[k]
Pr
[
Xs(j) ≤ τj
]
= |S−i(k)|q−i(k) . (3)
Equation 3 establishes the relation to q−i(k) for members of S(k+ 1) that contain i in one of the first k
positions.
Let S(k+ 1) = S(k+ 1)\
⋃
ℓ∈[k] S(k+ 1, ℓ). We then have
∑
s:S(k+1)
∏
j∈[k+1]\{ℓ}
Pr
[
Xs(j) ≤ τj
]
=
∑
s:S(k+1)
∏
j∈[k]\{ℓ}
Pr
[
Xs(j) ≤ τj
]
× Pr
[
Xs(k+1) ≤ τk+1
]
≤ (n − k)
∑
s:S−i(k+1)
∏
j∈[k]\{ℓ}
Pr
[
Xs(j) ≤ τj
]
= (n − k)|S−i(k)|q−i(k) ,
where the inequality is since Pr
[
Xs(k+1) ≤ τk+1
]
≤ 1.
Finally using this last equation and Equations 1 and 3 and since |S(k+ 1)| = n|S−i(k)| we obtain
θ(k + 1) =
1
|S(k + 1)|
∑
s∈S(k+1)
∏
j∈[k+1]
Pr
[
Xs(j) < τj
]
1
|S(k+ 1)|

∑
ℓ∈[k]
∑
s∈S(k+1,ℓ)
∏
j∈[k+1]
Pr
[
Xs(j) < τj
]
+
∑
s∈S(k+1)
∏
j∈[k+1]
Pr
[
Xs(j) < τj
]
≤
1
|S(k+ 1)|
(k|S−i(k)|q−i(k) + (n − k)|S−i(k)|q−i(k))
= q−i(k) .
✷
4 One Threshold Cannot Break 1
2
Barrier for Prophet Secretary
To illustrate that considering at least 2 thresholds is necessary to beat 12 barrier for the prophet secretary prob-
lem, we first give an example that shows achieving better than 12 -competitive ratio for any online algorithm
that uses only one threshold for the prophet secretary problem is not possible.
Theorem 7 There is no online algorithm for the prophet secretary problem that uses one threshold and can
achieve competitive ratio better than 0.5 + 12n .
Proof : Suppose we have n + 1 distributions where the first n distributions always gives 1
1−1/n
and the
(n + 1)th distribution gives n with probability 1n and gives 0 with probability 1 −
1
n . Therefore, with
probability 1n , the maximum is n, and with probability 1 −
1
n , the maximum is
1
1−1/n
. Thus, the expected
outcome of the offline optimum algorithm is 1n × n+ (1 −
1
n)×
1
1−1/n
= 2.
Now, suppose we have an online algorithm that uses one threshold, say T for a number T , that is the
online algorithm accepts the first number greater or equal to a threshold T . We consider two cases for T .
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The first case is if T > 1
1−1/n
for which the algorithm does not accept 1
1−1/n
and thus, the expected outcome
of such an algorithm is 1
n
× n = 1.
The second case is if T ≤ 1
1−1/n
. Observe that, with probability nn+1 , the first number is
1
1−1/n
and the
online algorithm accepts it. And, with probability 1n+1 , the distribution that gives n with probability
1
n will
be the first and the outcome of the algorithm is 1. Thus, the expected outcome of the online algorithm is
n
n+ 1
×
1
1− 1/n
+
1
n+ 1
× 1 =
n2
n2 − 1
+
1
n+ 1
≤ 1+
1
n
.
Therefore, the competitive ratio of the online algorithms that uses only one threshold is bounded by
1+1/n
2 = 0.5 +
1
2n . ✷
5 Two Thresholds Breaks 1
2
Barrier
Since using one threshold is hopeless, we now try using two thresholds. More formally, for the first half of
steps, we use a certain threshold, and then we use a different threshold for the rest of steps. We note that
similar to the one-threshold algorithm, both thresholds should be proportional to OPT . Furthermore, at the
beginning we should be optimistic and try to have a higher threshold, but if we cannot pick a value in the
first half, we may need to lower the bar! We show that by using two thresholds one can indeed achieve the
competitive ratio of 59 ≃ 0.55. In fact, this improvement beyond 1/2 happens even at n = 2. Thus as a
warm up before analyzing the main algorithm with n thresholds, we focus on the case of n = 2.
Let τ1 = α1OPT and τ2 = α2OPT for some 1 ≥ α1 ≥ α2 ≥ 0 to be optimized later. Recall that z1 and
z2 are the random variables showing the values picked up by the algorithm at step one and two, respectively.
We are interested in comparing E [z] with OPT . By Proposition 5 we have
E [z] =
∫
∞
0
Pr [z ≥ x]dx =
∫
∞
0
Pr [z1 ≥ x]dx+
∫
∞
0
Pr [z2 ≥ x]dx .
Observe that z1 (resp. z2) is either zero or has a value more than τ1 (resp. τ2). In fact, since τ1 ≥ τ2,
z is either zero or has a value more than τ2. Recall that θ(1) is the probability of z1 = 0 while θ(2) is the
probability of z1 = z2 = 0. This observation leads to the following simplification:
E [z] =
∫ τ2
0
Pr [z1 ≥ x]dx+
∫ τ1
τ2
Pr [z1 ≥ x]dx+
∫
∞
τ1
Pr [z1 ≥ x]dx+
∫ τ2
0
Pr [z2 ≥ x]dx+
∫
∞
τ2
Pr [z2 ≥ x]dx
=
∫ τ2
0
Pr [z ≥ x]dx+
∫τ1
τ2
Pr [z1 ≥ x]dx +
∫
∞
τ1
Pr [z1 ≥ x]dx+
∫
∞
τ2
Pr [z2 ≥ x]dx
= τ2(1 − θ(2)) + (τ1 − τ2)(1 − θ(1)) +
∫
∞
τ1
Pr [z1 ≥ x]dx+
∫
∞
τ2
Pr [z2 ≥ x]dx .
Let us first focus on Pr [z1 ≥ x]. The first value may come from any of the two distributions, thus we
have
Pr [z1 ≥ x] =
1
2
Pr [X1 ≥ x] +
1
2
Pr [X2 ≥ x] .
On the other hand, z2 is non-zero only if we do not pick anything at the first step. For i ∈ {1, 2}, we pick
a value of at least x drawn from Di at step two, if and only if: (i) the value drawn from Di is at least x; and
(ii) our algorithm does not pick a value from the previous step which is drawn from the other distribution.
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By definitions, the former happens with probability Pr [Xi ≥ x], while the latter happens with probability
q−i(1). Since these two events are independent we have
Pr [z2 ≥ x] =
1
2
∑
i∈{1,2}
q−i(1)Pr [Xi ≥ x] ≥
θ(2)
2
∑
i
Pr [Xi ≥ x] .
where the last inequality follows from Proposition 6, although the proposition is trivial for n = 2. We can
now continue analyzing E [z] from before
E [z] = τ2(1 − θ(2)) + (τ1 − τ2)(1 − θ(1)) +
∫
∞
τ1
Pr [z1 ≥ x]dx+
∫
∞
τ2
Pr [z2 ≥ x]dx
≥ τ2(1 − θ(2)) + (τ1 − τ2)(1 − θ(1)) +
θ(1)
2
∫
∞
τ1
∑
i
Pr [Xi ≥ x]dx+
θ(2)
2
∫
∞
τ2
∑
i
Pr [Xi ≥ x]dx .
We note that although the θ(1) factor is not required in the third term of the last inequality, we include
it so that the formulas can have the same formation as in the general formula of the next sections.
It remains to bound
∫
∞
τk
∑
i Pr [Xi ≥ x] for k ∈ {1, 2}. Recall that OPT = E [maxi Xi]. Hence for every
k ∈ {1, 2} and since Pr [maxXi ≥ x] ≤ 1 we have
OPT =
∫τk
0
Pr [maxXi ≥ x]dx+
∫
∞
τk
Pr [maxXi ≥ x]dx ≤ τk +
∫
∞
τk
Pr [maxXi ≥ x]dx .
From τk = αkOPT and since Pr [maxXi ≥ x] ≤
∑
i Pr [Xi ≥ x]dx we then have
(1 − αk)OPT ≤
∫
∞
τk
Pr [maxXi ≥ x]dx ≤
∫
∞
τk
∑
i
Pr [Xi ≥ x]dx .
Therefore we get
E [z] ≥ τ2(1 − θ(2)) + (τ1 − τ2)(1 − θ(1)) +
θ(1)
2
∫
∞
τ1
∑
i
Pr [Xi ≥ x]dx+
θ(2)
2
∫
∞
τ2
∑
i
Pr [Xi ≥ x]dx
≥ (α2OPT)(1 − θ(2)) + (α1 − α2)OPT(1 − θ(1)) +
θ(1)
2
(1 − α1)OPT +
θ(2)
2
(1 − α2)OPT
= OPT
(
α1 + θ(1)(
1 + 2α2 − 3α1
2
) + θ(2)(
1 − 3α2
2
)
)
.
Therefore by choosing α2 = 1/3 and α1 = 5/9, the coefficients of θ(1) and θ(2) become zero, leading
to the competitive ratio of 5/9 ≃ 0.55. In the next section, we show how one can generalize the arguments
to the case of n thresholds for arbitrary n.
6 (1− 1
e
≈ 0.63)-Competitive Ratio Using n Thresholds
In this section we prove our main theorem. In particular, we invoke Algorithm Prophet Secretary with n
distinct thresholds τ1, . . . , τn. The thresholds τ1, . . . , τn that we consider are non-adaptive (i.e., Algorithm
Prophet Secretary is oblivious to the history) and non-increasing. Intuitively, this is because as we move to
the end of stream we should be more pessimistic and use lower thresholds to catch remaining higher values.
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Formally, for every k ∈ [n], we consider threshold τk = αk · OPT where the sequence α1, . . . , αn is
non-increasing that is, α1 ≥ α1 ≥ . . . ≥ αn. We invoke Algorithm Prophet Secretary with these thresholds
and analyze the competitive ratio of Algorithm Prophet Secretary with respect to coefficients αk. Theorem 1
shows that there exists a sequence of coefficients αk that leads to the competitive ratio of (1− 1/e) ≈ 0.63.
Proof of Theorem 1. We prove the theorem in two steps: First, we find a lower bound on E [z] in terms
of OPT and coefficients αi. Second, we set coefficients αk so that (1) α1 becomes the competitive ratio of
Algorithm Prophet Secretary and (2) α1 converges to 1− 1/e, when n goes to infinity.
We start by proving the following auxiliary lemmas. In the first lemma, we find a lower bound for∫
∞
τk
Pr [maxXi ≥ x]dx based on OPT = E [maxi Xi].
Lemma 8
∫
∞
τk
Pr [maxXi ≥ x]dx ≥ (1 − αk)OPT .
Proof : For an arbitrary k ∈ [n] and since Pr [maxXi ≥ x] ≤ 1, we have
OPT = E
[
max
i
Xi
]
=
∫
∞
0
Pr [maxXi ≥ x]dx
=
∫ τk
0
Pr [maxXi ≥ x]dx+
∫
∞
τk
Pr [maxXi ≥ x]dx
≤ τk +
∫
∞
τk
Pr [maxXi ≥ x]dx .
Since, by definition τk = αk ·OPT , we have (1 − αk) ·OPT ≤
∫
∞
τk
Pr [maxXi ≥ x]dx. ✷
Next, to find a lower bound for E [z], we first split it into two terms. Later, we find lower bounds for
each one of these terms based on OPT = E [maxi Xi].
Lemma 9 Let z =
∑n
k=1 zk denote the value chosen by Algorithm Prophet Secretary. For z we have
E [z] =
n∑
k=1
∫ τk
0
Pr [zk ≥ x]dx+
n∑
k=1
∫
∞
τk
Pr [zk ≥ x]dx .
Proof : By Proposition 5 we have
E [z] =
∫
∞
0
Pr [z ≥ x]dx =
n∑
k=1
∫
∞
0
Pr [zk ≥ x]dx
=
n∑
k=1
∫ τk
0
Pr [zk ≥ x]dx+
n∑
k=1
∫
∞
τk
Pr [zk ≥ x]dx ,
where we use this fact that z =
∑n
k=1 zk because we only pick one number for a fixed sequence of drawn
values and a fixed permutation and therefore, at most one of zk’s is non-zero. ✷
Lemma 10
∑n
k=1
∫τk
0
Pr [zk ≥ x]dx ≥ OPT
∑n
k=1(1 − θ(k))(αk − αk+1).
Proof : Suppose x ≤ τk. Observe that the event zk ≥ x occurs when Algorithm Prophet Secretary
chooses a value at step k. In fact, since the thresholds are non-increasing, whatever we pick at the first k
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steps would be at least x. Recall that for every k ∈ [n], θ(k) is the probability that Algorithm Prophet
Secretary does not choose a value from the first k steps. Hence, for every k ∈ [n] and x ≤ τk we have∑
j≤k
Pr [zj ≥ x] = 1− θ(k) . (4)
To simplify the notation, we assume that α0 = ∞ which means τ0 = ∞ and we let αn+1 = 0 which
means τn+1 = 0. Therefore we have
n∑
k=1
∫τk
0
Pr [zk ≥ x]dx =
n∑
k=1
∫ τk
τn+1
Pr [zk ≥ x]dx .
Next, we use Equation (4) to prove the lemma as follows.
n∑
k=1
∫τk
0
Pr [zk ≥ x]dx =
n∑
k=1
∫τk
τn+1
Pr [zk ≥ x]dx
=
n∑
k=1
n∑
r=k
∫ τr
τr+1
Pr [zk ≥ x]dx
=
n∑
r=1
∫τr
τr+1
r∑
k=1
Pr [zk ≥ x]dx ≥
n∑
r=1
∫τr
τr+1
(1− θ(r))dx
=
n∑
r=1
(1 − θ(r))(τr − τr+1) = OPT ·
n∑
k=1
(1 − θ(k))(αk − αk+1) .
✷
Lemma 11
∑n
k=1
∫
∞
τk
Pr [zk ≥ x]dx ≥ OPT
∑
k
θ(k)
n (1 − αk).
Proof : Recall that for every distribution Di we draw a number Xi. Later, we randomly permute the
numbers X1, · · · , Xn. Let the sequence of indices after the random permutation be π1, . . . , πn that is, at step
k, number Xπk for πk ∈ [n] is revealed.
Suppose x ≥ τk. We break the event zk > 0 to n different scenarios depending on which index of the
distributions D1, · · · ,Dn is mapped to index πk in the random permutation. Let us consider the scenario in
which Algorithm Prophet Secretary chooses the value drawn from a distribution i at step k. Such a scenario
happens if (i) Algorithm Prophet Secretary does not choose a value from the first k − 1 steps which are
not drawn from i, and (ii) Xi ≥ τk. Observe that the two events are independent. Therefore, we have
Pr [zk ≥ x] =
∑
i Pr [πk = i] · Pr [Xi ≥ x] · q−i(k− 1). Since πk is an index in the random permutation we
obtain
Pr [zk ≥ x] =
∑
i
Pr [πk = i]Pr [Xi ≥ x] · q−i(k− 1) =
1
n
∑
i
Pr [Xi ≥ x]q−i(k− 1) .
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Using Proposition 6 and an application of the union bound we then have
Pr [zk ≥ x] =
∑
i
Pr [πk = i] · Pr [Xi ≥ x] · q−i(k− 1)
=
1
n
∑
i
Pr [Xi ≥ x] · q−i(k− 1)
≥
θ(k)
n
·
∑
i
Pr [Xi ≥ x] ≥
θ(k)
n
· Pr
[
max
i
Xi ≥ x
]
.
Therefore, we obtain the following lower bound on
∑n
k=1
∫
∞
τk
Pr [zk ≥ x]dx.
n∑
k=1
∫
∞
τk
Pr [zk ≥ x]dx ≥
∑
k
∫
∞
τk
θ(k)
n
Pr [maxXi ≥ x]dx
=
∑
k
θ(k)
n
∫
∞
τk
Pr [maxXi ≥ x]dx .
Finally, we use the lower bound of Lemma 8 for
∫
∞
τk
Pr [maxXi ≥ x]dx to prove the lemma.
n∑
k=1
∫
∞
τk
Pr [zk ≥ x]dx ≥
∑
k
θ(k)
n
∫
∞
τk
Pr [maxXi ≥ x]dx
≥
∑
k
θ(k)
n
· (1 − αk) ·OPT = OPT ·
∑
k
θ(k)
n
· (1 − αk) .
✷
Now we can plug in the lower bounds of Lemmas 10 and 11 into Lemma 9 to obtain a lower bound for
E [z].
Corollary 12 Let z =
∑n
k=1 zk denote the value chosen by Algorithm Prophet Secretary. For z we have
E [z] ≥ OPT · (α1 +
n∑
k=1
θ(k)(
1
n
−
αk
n
− αk + αk+1)) .
We finish the proof of the theorem by proving the following claim.
Lemma 13 The competitive ratio of Algorithm Prophet Secretary is at least α1 which quickly converges to
1 − 1/e ≈ 0.63 when n goes to infinity.
Proof : Using Corollary 12, for z we have
E [z] ≥ OPT
(
α1 +
n∑
k=1
θ(k)
(
1
n
−
αk
n
− αk + αk+1
))
,
which means that the competitive ratio depends on the probabilities θ(k)’s. However, we can easily get rid
of the probabilities θ(k)’s by choosing αk’s such that for every k,
(
1
n −
αk
n − αk + αk+1
)
= 0.
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More formally, by starting from αn+1 = 0 and choosing αk = 1+nαk+11+n for k ≤ n, the competitive ratio
of the algorithm would be α1. Below, we show that when n goes to infinity, α1 quickly goes to 1 − 1/e
which means that the competitive ratio of Algorithm Prophet Secretary converges to 1− 1/e ≈ 0.63.
First, we show by the induction that αk =
∑n−k
i=0
ni
(1+n)i+1
. For the base case we have
αn =
1+ nαn+1
1 + n
=
1 + n× 0
1+ n
=
n0
(1 + n)1
.
Given αk+1 =
∑n−(k+1)
i=0
ni
(1+n)i+1
we show the equality for αk as follows.
αk =
1+ nαk+1
1+ n
=
1 + n(
∑n−(k+1)
i=0
ni
(1+n)i+1
)
1+ n
=
n0
(1 + n)1
+
n−(k+1)∑
i=0
ni+1
(1+ n)i+2
=
n−k∑
i=0
ni
(1 + n)i+1
.
Now we are ready to show α1 ≥ 1− 1/e when n goes to infinity.
lim
n→∞
α1 = lim
n→∞
n−1∑
i=0
ni
(n + 1)i+1
= lim
n→∞
1
n + 1
n−1∑
i=0
(1 −
1
n+ 1
)i
≈ lim
n→∞
1
n + 1
n−1∑
i=0
e−i/n ≈
∫ 1
0
e−xdx = 1− 1/e .
✷
7 Lower Bounds for Prophet Secretary and Minimization Variants of Classical Stopping
Theory Problems
In this section we give our lower bounds for the prophet secretary problem and the minimization variants of
the prophet inequality and prophet secretary problems. First, in Section 7.1 we show that no online algorithm
for the prophet secretary problem can achieve a competitive ratio better than 0.75. Later, in Section 7.2 we
consider the minimization variant of the prophet inequality problem. We show that, even for the simple
case in which numbers are drawn from identical and independent distributions (i.i.d.), there is no constant
competitive online algorithm for the minimization variants of the prophet inequality and prophet secretary
problems.
7.1 0.75-Lower Bound of Prophet Secretary Problem
Now we prove Theorem 3 that improves the above lower bound by showing that there is no algorithm for
the prophet secretary problem with competitive ratio 0.75 + ǫ.
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Proof of Theorem 3. It is known that no algorithm can guarantee a competitive ratio better than 0.5 + ǫ,
where ǫ is an arbitrary small positive number less than 1. A hard example that shows this upper bound is as
follow. We have two distributions. The first distribution always gives 1, and the second distribution gives 1ǫ
with probability ǫ and 0 with probability 1 − ǫ. Observe that if we either accept the first number or reject
it our expected outcome is 1. On the other hand, the offline optimum algorithm takes 1ǫ with probability
ǫ and 1 with probability 1 − ǫ. Therefore, the expected outcome of the offline optimum algorithm is
ǫ · 1ǫ + 1 · (1 − ǫ) = 2− ǫ, and the competitive ratio is at most
1
2−ǫ ≤ 0.5 + ǫ.
The above example contains exactly two distributions. Thus, if the drawn numbers from these distri-
butions arrive in a random order, with probability 0.5 the arrival order is the worst case order. This means
that in the prophet secretary, with probability 0.5 the expected outcome of any algorithm on this example
is at most 1, while the offline optimum algorithm is always 2 − ǫ. Therefore, there is no algorithm for the
prophet secretary problem with competitive ratio better than 0.5×1+0.5×(2−ǫ)2−ǫ ≤ 0.75 + ǫ.
7.2 Lower Bounds for Minimization Variants of Classical Stopping Theory Problems
In this section, we consider the minimization variant of the prophet secretary problem, in which we need to
select one element from the input and we aim to minimize the value of the selected element. Indeed, we
provide some hardness results for very simple and restricted cases of this problem. We extend our results to
the minimization variant of the classical prophet inequality or minimization variant of secretary problem.
First, we consider the simple case that numbers are drawn from identical and independent distributions.
In particular, we prove Theorem 4 that shows, even for the simple case of identical and independent distribu-
tions, there is no (1.11)
n
6 competitive online algorithm for the minimization variant of the prophet inequality
problem. Since the input items come from identical distributions, independently, randomly reordering them
do not change the distribution of the items in the input. Thus, this result holds for the minimization variant
of the prophet secretary problem as well.
Later, we give more power to the online algorithm and let it to change its decision once; we call this
model online algorithm with one exchange. In Theorem 14 we show that, for any large number C there is no
C competitive online algorithm with one exchange for the minimization variant of the prophet inequality. In
Corollary 15 and Corollary 16 we extend this hardness result to the minimization variant of prophet secretary
problem and secretary problem, respectively.
Proof of Theorem 4. Suppose we have n identical distributions, each gives 0 with probability 13 , 1 with
probability 13 and 2
n with probability 13 . One can see that with probability (
1
3 )
n
, all of the numbers are 2n
and thus the minimum number is 2n. Also, with probability (2
3
)n − (1
3
)n, there is no 0 and there is at least
one 1, and thus, the minimum is 1. In all the other cases, the minimum is 0. Therefore, the expected outcome
of the offline optimum algorithm is (13)
n × 2n + (23)
n − (13)
n < 2
n+1
3n .
For this example, without loss of generality we can assume that any online algorithm accept 0 as soon
as it appears, and also it does not accept 2n except for the last item. Assume i + 1 is the first time that
the algorithm is willing to accept 1. The probability that we arrive in this point is (23)
i and the probability
that we see 1 at that point is 13 . On the other hand, the probability that such an algorithm does not accept
anything up to the last number and sees that the last number is 2n is at least (2
3
)i(1
3
)n−i. Therefore, the
expected outcome of the online algorithm is at least (23)
i 1
3 × 1 + (
2
3)
i(13 )
n−i × 2n = 2
i3n−i−1+3i
3n . Thus, the
competitive ratio is at least
2i3n−i−1 + 3i
2n+1
=
1
6
(
3n−i
2n−i
+
3i+1
2n
) .
If i ≤ 0.73n, the left term is at least (1.11)
n
6 ; otherwise, the right term is at least
(1.11)n
6 .
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Theorem 14 For any large positive number C, there is no C-competitive algorithm for minimization prophet
inequality with one exchange.
Proof : Suppose we have three distributions as follows. The first distribution always gives 1. The second
distribution gives 1
ǫ
with probability ǫ and gives ǫ
1−ǫ
with probability 1 − ǫ. The third distribution gives 1
ǫ
with probability ǫ and gives 0 with probability 1 − ǫ. We set ǫ later.
We observe that the minimum number is 0 with probability 1− ǫ, is ǫ1−ǫ with probability ǫ(1 − ǫ) and
is 1 with probability ǫ2. Thus, the expected outcome of the optimum algorithm is
(1 − ǫ)× 0+ ǫ(1 − ǫ)×
ǫ
1 − ǫ
+ ǫ2 × 1 = 2ǫ2 .
Now, we show that the outcome of any online algorithm with one exchange for this input is at least ǫ.
In fact, this means that, the competitive ratio can not be less than ǫ
2ǫ2
= 1
2ǫ
. If we set ǫ = 1
2C
, this means
that there is no C-competitive algorithm for the minimization prophet inequality with one exchange.
Recall that there is no uncertainty in the first number. If an algorithm withdraw the first number, it can
take the outcome of either the second distribution or the third distribution. However, if we do this, with
probability ǫ2 the outcome is 1ǫ . Thus, the expected outcome is at least ǫ as desired.
Now, we just need to show that if an algorithm does not select the first number, its expected outcome is
at least ǫ. Observe that if this happens, then the algorithm has only the option of choosing either the second
and the third distribution. We consider two cases. The first case is if the algorithm does not select the second
number, then it must select the third number. Therefore, with probability ǫ, the outcome of the algorithm is
1 and thus, the expected outcome is at least ǫ. The second case occurs if the algorithm selects the second
number and that is ǫ1−ǫ . Therefore, with probability 1 − ǫ, the outcome of the algorithm is
ǫ
1−ǫ and again
the expected outcome is ǫ
1−ǫ
× (1 − ǫ) = ǫ.
✷
Finally, we show that even for the minimization variant of the prophet secretary there is no hope to get
a constant competitive ratio.
Corollary 15 For any large number C, there is no C-competitive algorithm for minimization prophet sec-
retary with one exchange.
Proof : In Theorem 14, we have three distributions. Thus, in the prophet secretary model the worst
case order happen with probability 16 . Thus, the competitive ratio can not be more than
1
6
·ǫ
2ǫ2
= 112ǫ . If we
set ǫ = 112C , this essentially means that there is no C-competitive algorithm for the minimization prophet
secretary with one exchange. ✷
Corollary 16 For any large number C there is no C-competitive algorithm for the minimization secretary
problem with one exchange.
Proof : Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exists an algorithm Alg for the minimization
secretary problem which is C-competitive. Consider all possible realizations of the example in Theorem 14.
Algorithm Alg is C-competitive when each of the these realizations comes in a random order. Therefore,
Algorithm Alg is C-competitive when the input is a distribution over these realizations. This says that Alg
is a C-competitive algorithm for the minimization prophet secretary, which contradicts Corollary 15 and
completes the proof. ✷
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